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Abstract: This  paper  provides  an  empirical  assessment  of 
race-to-the-bottom unilateralism. It suggests that decades of 
unilateral tariff cutting in Asia‟s emerging economies have 
been  driven  by  a  competition  to  attract  FDI  from  Japan. 
Using spatial econometrics, I show that tariffs on parts and 
components,  a  crucial  locational  determinant  for  Japanese 
firms,  converged  across  countries  following  a  contagion 
pattern. Tariffs followed those of competing countries if the 
latter  were  lower,  if  FDI  jealousy  was  high,  and  when 
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1. Introduction 
One aspect of trade liberalization that has received too little attention in the economic 
literature is that of unilateralism. This is puzzling as unilateral trade liberalization accounts for 
the lion‟s share of trade liberalization since the 1980s. The World Bank (2005) estimates that 
it accounts for as much as two thirds of the 21 percentage point cuts in tariffs in developing 
countries between 1983 and 2003. Moreover, the two decades of unilateral tariff-cutting in 
emerging economies accompanied the most successful trade-led development model of the 
past 50 years, i.e. “Factory Asia”. Indeed, Baldwin (2006) writes that most of the rapid 
expansion of trade and the fragmentation of the supply chain across countries in East Asia
2  
have been fostered by unilateral rather than preferential trade liberalisation (see Figure 1). 
Understanding what drove this liberalization is therefore crucial to our understanding of the 
process of economic development.  










While some political economy theories have been developed to explain unilateral trade 
liberalization, e.g. soft unilateralism (Coates and Ludema 2001, Richardson 2001), IMF 
pressure, ideological leadership (Edwards and Lederman 1998), and preferential tariff 
complementarity (Estevadeordal et al. 2008, Calvo-Pardo et al. 2009), none seem appropriate 
                                                 
2 First in electronics and then in sport footwear, televisions and radio receivers, office equipment, electrical 
machinery, power and machine tools, cameras and watches, and printing and publishing (Sally 2008).   4 
to explain what happened in the emerging economies of East Asia from the end of the 1980s 
until the mid 2000s.  
One exception is race-to-the-bottom unilateralism, which suggests tariff cuts were driven by a 
competition for FDI (Baldwin 2006). More precisely, it suggests East Asian governments 
started cutting tariffs in the 1980s as they knew they were facing serious competition in 
attracting Japanese FDI and low tariffs were perceived as a decisive locational determinant by 
Japanese firms which relied on imports of components for local processing. The desire for 
FDI, driven by the job creation and political support that came with FDI, would have led 
governments to cut tariffs to obtain marginal locational advantages over similar countries. 
Eventually, this led to bottom levels of tariffs across countries. 
This paper provides, to the best of my knowledge, the first empirical assessment of race-to-
the-bottom unilateralism. Focusing my analysis on seven Asian emerging economies, and 
using tools from spatial econometrics, I show that tariffs on parts and components followed 
those of competing countries if the latter were lower, if FDI jealousy was high, and if 
competing countries were at a similar level of development, hence competing more 
intensively at the tariff level. As a counterfactual I show that these results do not hold when 
using tariffs on finished products nor when estimating the model for countries that are not part 
of the sliced-up supply chain, such as Australia.  
Nevertheless, I also find a role for regionalism in MFN liberalization, though there is no 
indication that it is any stronger than nor substitute for the competitive emulation effect of the 
race to the bottom. Moreover, I find no indication that IMF programs‟ conditions, which 
followed the Asian crisis of 1997 in Thailand, Indonesia and Korea, explain the tariff cutting 
in parts and components. 
The next section reviews the literature on unilateral liberalisation, races-to-the bottom and 
policy diffusion and describes the theoretical framework. In a third section I provide empirical 
evidence that tariffs were indeed racing to the bottom. A last section concludes.  
2. Literature review   
2.1 Unilateral liberalisation 
While some theories have emerged to explain unilateral trade liberalisation, its causes are yet 
to be fully understood. According to Edwards and Lederman (1998), unilateral liberalization 
can be the result of ideological leadership. They provide evidence from Chile, where tariffs 
were cut during Pinochet‟s regime, as the dictator was driven by the ideas of the Chicago   5 
school. Another branch of theory views unilateral tariff cuts as a strategy for a large and 
influential country to obtain reciprocal liberalisation or a trade agreement.  This is described 
as soft unilateralism by Richardson (2001). To analyze this leadership in trade policy, Coates 
and Ludema (2001) developed a model where one country‟s unilateral liberalization lowers 
the political stakes associated with trade liberalization in the foreign country, lowering the 
political cost of reaching a successful trade agreement. Similarly, Krishna and Mitra (2005) 
built a model in which unilateral liberalization by a large country raises the world price of the 
small country‟s exportable good, increases the incentives for the export business community 
to lobby, and induces reciprocal tariff cuts in the partner country.  
Another theory explaining unilateral cuts is that of preferential tariff complementarity 
(Estevadeordal et al. 2008, Calvo-Pardo et al. 2009). Here, the logic is that with high external 
tariffs, the possibility of costly trade diversion resulting from an RTA could provide 
governments with an incentive to liberalize at the MFN level, or that a shrinking import-
competing sector could realign political interests away from protection.   
None of these theories seem appropriate to explain what happened in the emerging economies 
of East Asia from the end of the 1980‟s until the mid 2000‟s. Ideological leadership may 
apply only to dictatorships and does not fit with progressive tariff cutting in multiple 
countries. Considering the size of East Asia‟s emerging economies, their tariff cuts are very 
unlikely to have been part of a soft leadership strategy. And while a causal link from 
regionalism to unilateralism may exist in ASEAN countries, it cannot be applied to the entire 
region studied here as regional trade agreements, apart from the ASEAN agreement, started 
only at the end of the period studied.  
2.2 Races-to-the bottom and policy diffusion 
Hence, the most promising theory is that of race-to-the-bottom unilateralism, stylised by 
Baldwin (2006) but also mentioned by Kimura (2003) and Ando and Kimura (2005), where 
countries are cutting tariffs in a competition to attract FDI. The race-to-the-bottom model is 
well known in international economics. In its most famous application, countries competing 
for FDI reach an uncooperative Nash equilibrium with bottom levels of corporate tax rates 
(see Devereux et al. 2008 for a recent analysis). The model has been applied to many 
locational determinants of FDI. Barros and Cabral (2000) have looked at subsidies, Mehmet 
and Tavakoli (2003) at wages, and various other studies have looked at labour and 
environmental standards. However, providing empirical evidence for such races-to-the-
bottom has not been an easy task, partly because of inappropriate methods, and partly because 
they often do not happen due to conflicting forces. For example, Mendoza and Tesa (2005)   6 
argue that Europe has not seen any race to the bottom in taxes due to wealth distribution and 
fiscal solvency issues.  
In race-to-the-bottom unilateralism, tariffs are the locational determinant of choice. The 
relevance of this policy instrument is due to the specific nature of FDI in Factory Asia. In the 
1980s, East Asia‟s emerging economies started applying new development strategies which 
consisted in attracting FDI in manufacturing plants that relied on imports of components for 
local processing. As they knew they were facing serious competition in attracting FDI, 
especially from Japan
3 (Lamy et al. 2006), they all started to reduce import barriers and cut 
tariffs, especially on parts and components, to provide the best location advantages to 
Japanese multinationals (Ando and Kimura 2005, Sally 2008). Inui et al. (2008), using a firm-
level dataset, show that the level of tariffs does play an important role in the location choices 
of foreign affiliates by Japanese firms. This is because imports of intermediates are crucial to 
Japanese firms. In 1996, Japanese firms accounted for almost 30% of all of Thailand‟s 
imports, worth around $22 billion (Kimura 2003).  
Moreover, since emerging economies started hosting massive FDI before local indigenous 
firms were well developed, the industrial organization of the manufacturing sector was 
characterized by a heavy dependence on foreign affiliates (Kimura 2003). Thus, the tariff cuts 
were critical to creating new industry jobs. Tariff cutting contagion picked up as governments 
were affected by tariff cuts in competing countries that attracted FDI, missing out on job 
creation and political support.  
Race-to-the-bottom unilateralism can also be seen as yardstick competition (Besley and Case 
1995) in which incumbents care about what other incumbents are doing since voters compare 
the FDI performance of their country to that of their neighbours when electing their 
government. The idea is also reminiscent of Ethier‟s framework (1998) explaining the spread 
of regionalism, where regional arrangements, instead of unilateral tariff cuts, give a small 
country a marginal advantage over similar countries in attracting export-platform FDI because 
of favourable access to a large market. Finally, it can also be seen through political science‟s 
policy diffusion theory, according to which policy choices in one country affect those in 
neighbours either because they alter the material payoffs or because they disseminate new 
info about the impact of these policies (Elkins and Simmons 2005).  
 
                                                 
3 From 1980 to 1987, Japanese FDI grew by 21.6% per year as the yen was appreciating and Japan could no 
longer use GSP to access US and EU (Hyun and Whitmore 1989). Moreover, in 1989 Japan was the biggest 
foreign investor in the world with $44.2 billion (Tejima 1992).   7 
3. Did tariffs really race to the bottom? 
If tariffs indeed raced to the bottom, we should observe convergence in tariffs across 
countries. Also, the race should affect mostly parts and components, rather than finished 
products, as these were critical to Japanese firms. Last but not least, tariffs should be 
correlated in competitive space, i.e. they should follow a policy contagion pattern, following 
those of neighbours in reaction to missed opportunities to attract FDI. I first describe the data 
used to test these predictions. 
3.1 Data 
I focus on seven Asian emerging economies that constitute Factory Asia, i.e. Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and China as they were all 
competing for Japanese FDI over the 1989-2006 period. I look at tariff data for 125 parts and 
components product lines, defined as all HS 6 digit tariff lines whose definitions contain the 
words “parts” or “components”, as in Ando and Kimura (2005), and aggregated at the HS 4-
digit level. Examples include bases and covers for sewing machines, carbon electrodes, 
carbon brushes, lamp carbons, or watch cases. The data is from UNCTAD‟s TRAINS 
database. I also build a counterfactual of random finished products aggregated in 125 HS4 
categories.  
Since my analysis requires a balanced panel and some observations were missing, I 
aggregated the data into six time periods as in Calvo-Pardo et al. (2009). The six periods are: 
1. the pre-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement period (before 1993); 2. the early years of the 
agreement (1993-1995); 3. the Asian crisis period (1996-1998); 4. the post-crisis period 
(1999-2001); 5. (2002-2004); 6. further liberalization by all members (2005-2006).  
I use Japanese FDI employment data from the Japanese Research Institute of Economy, Trade 
and Industry Foreign Direct Investment Database which contains estimates on employment 
for Japanese foreign affiliates by country from 1989 to 2003.  
3.2 Convergence in tariffs 
As can be seen in Figure 2, tariffs in parts and components were on average repeatedly cut 
from 1989 till 2003. After 1995, when the WTO was set up and as competition with China 
intensified, MFN tariffs continued to go down in all countries, while bound rates remained 
flat.  
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To further investigate the convergence in tariffs associated with the race to the bottom, I first 
test for beta convergence. Table 1 gives the beta convergence estimate across countries, 
within product-period. The significant result suggests that, for every product in every period, 
cuts were systematically deeper (in percentage terms) in countries that had a higher applied 
MFN tariff. On average, a tariff one percentage point higher led to a cut 0.486% deeper for 
parts and components. However, while I find that tariffs on parts and components were on 
average about 4.5% deeper than cuts on finished products, I find no significant difference in 
beta convergence between parts and components and finished products.  
Table 1. Beta convergence in MFN tariffs (within 
product-period, across countries) 
  Parts  Non-parts 
Tariff (at t=0)  -0.486***  -0.465*** 
  (0.08)  (0.06) 
Constant  -14.02***  -8.38*** 
  (1.24)  (1.28) 
R2  0.24  0.19 
N  3882  4029 
OLS regressions within product-period across 
countries. Dependent variable is tariff growth. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
 
Moreover, tariffs across countries were converging to similar levels as the standard deviation 
fell from 5.57 to 2.13 over the 25 years covered (figure 3). This sigma convergence is sharper 
for parts and components than for finished products, suggesting more intense competition.   
   9 
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The data so far is indicative of tariffs racing to the bottom, as countries with higher tariffs 
were cutting deeper, trying to catch-up on their competitors, and as tariffs came to closer and 
closer levels across countries. But the question of who cut, when, and why, remains. 
According to the theory, governments were reacting to lower tariffs and FDI employment 
gains in competing countries, feeling FDI jealousy. I now turn to this question. 
3.3 Are tariffs correlated in competitive space? 
Racing-to-the-bottom, tariffs should be correlated in competitive space. More precisely, 
tariffs should follow tariffs of competing countries if the latter are lower, if FDI jealousy is 
high, i.e. if Japanese FDI employment gains in competing countries are big, and if competing 
countries are at a similar level of development. To test for such spatial dependence in 
competitive space, I estimate the following model, 
         
1 ijt t ij ijt W , 
where ijt   is the tariff of product i, in country j in period t,  ij   is a country-product fixed 
effect,  t   is a period dummy, which accounts for the general downward trend and region-
wide shocks, and W a the weighting matrix that accounts for the competitive distance 
between countries. This approach is similar to that of Bordignon et al (2003) and Swank 
(2006). 
The choice of weighting matrix determines the type of spatial correlation. The first prediction 
of the race-to-the-bottom theory is that tariffs follow their competitors‟ only if the latter were   10 
lower. Hence, I define W1 as a matrix that gives weight only to competing countries‟ tariffs 
that are lower
4.  
The second prediction is that Japanese FDI employment in competing countries is seen as 
“lost” employment, creating FDI jealousy. If competing countries had lower tariffs and 
“stole” FDI employment, it is even more likely for tariffs to follow these competitors‟. Hence 
I build W2 whose elements contain the amounts of Japanese FDI employment in each country 
in each period to give more weights to tariffs of countries that received more FDI 
employment. I also build a more “extreme” version of W2 where employment gains in 
neighbouring countries only matter if they are superior to those at home. The idea is that a 
country that benefits from the biggest employment gains might not be jealous of modest 
employment gains in competing countries.  
Finally, if countries at similar levels of development have similar wage structures and labour 
force qualifications, they might be competing more intensively at the tariff level. Hence I also 
construct W3, whose elements are the inverted GDP per capita differences between countries, 
giving more weight to tariffs of countries at closer levels of development.  
The spatial weighting matrix, W, can thus be computed as W= W1 ○ (W2 + W3). For each 
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I use OLS to estimate the coefficients as the period lag on the right-hand side takes away the 
endogeneity (Egger and Larch 2008) and estimate the model for parts and components and for 
finished products separately.  
3.3.1 Results 
The first row of table 2 gives the results using W as described above, using the less “extreme” 
version of W2. The first line gives estimates for parts and components while the second line 
gives the estimate for finished products. For parts and components, I obtain a significant and 
positive ρ of 0.852 which indicates a strong and positive dependence in competitive space, as 
predicted by theory. Standard errors clustered at the country level as well as bootstrapped 
standard errors confirm the overall significance of the result
5. As expected, the size of the 
                                                 
4 More details on the construction of the matrices are given in the appendix.  
5 Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors imply significant coefficients in all cases.   11 
coefficient is smaller for finished products, at 0.385, as is the adjusted R
2 at 71.2% compared 
to 74%, suggesting the model provides a better fit for parts and components. 
Table 2. Do tariffs follow “competitors’” lower tariffs? 
Tariffs on parts and components vs. finished products  
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Within country-product regressions with period dummies. Dependent variable is MFN tariff. Explaining variable 
is weighted sum of tariffs of competing countries in previous period. First line is for parts and components; 
second line for finished products. 
 
3.3.2 Robustness checks 
I proceed to a number of robustness checks. First, I check if the results change when using the 
more “extreme” version of W2, where only the tariffs of countries that received more FDI 
employment matter.  The estimates in the second row of table 2 indicate that, while the results 
still hold, they are not as strong. This provides support to the idea that all FDI employment 
that goes to competing countries is viewed as “lost”, no matter how much one receives. 
Second, to verify if similar levels of development really matter, I use only W1○W2 as a 
weighting matrix, omitting the importance of GDP per capita differences. The results, given 
in the third row, are again very convincing, with a ρ of 0.816 and an R
2 of 73.35% for parts 
and components, suggesting tariff competition is intense even between countries at different 
levels of development. But the lower adjusted R
2 and coefficient indicate that the full 
weighting matrix derived from theory provides a better fit.  
In the fourth row I show results using only W1○W3, where only GDP per capita similarity 
would drive the correlation in tariffs. Again, the “competitive space” correlation still holds, 
but the fit is not as good as when including FDI employment jealousy, again reinforcing 
support for the race-to-the-bottom theory. 
As one might object that these results hold no matter what weighting matrix is used and hence 
do not provide much evidence of a race to the bottom in tariffs, in the fifth row I provide the   12 
results using a placebo, non-theory based, explaining variable, i.e. the simple average of 
competitor‟s tariffs. I fail to find similar results. Not only does this model fit better tariffs of 
finished products, but the estimated ρ are very low and statistically insignificant.  
Finally, inspired by traditional spatial economics, I also test the model using a weighting 
matrix giving more weight to geographically close countries, i.e. using inverted distance 
between countries‟ main cities as weights using data from CEPII. The coefficient, on the sixth 
row, is now negative and insignificant, once again providing support for consequential 
previous results. Graphically, this can be seen in figure 4 which compares the competitive 
spatial correlation of 0.85 obtained using the theory based weighting matrix (first row of 
table 2) to the -0.12 spatial correlation obtained when using geographic distances (sixth row).  
No weighting matrix provides a spatial correlation fit as high as the theory based one, strongly 
supporting the race-to-the-bottom story. 
Figure 4. Competitive space correlation vs. geographic space correlation 
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coef = -.12917937, se = .02859993, t = -4.52
 
Note: Both tariffs and weighted tariffs are taken as deviations from the country-product mean and period mean. 
 
Another placebo test is to estimate the model on Australia, a country that is not part of 
Factory Asia and did not participate in the tariff race to the bottom. I check for a spatial 
correlation between the tariffs on parts and components in Australia and in the countries of 
Factory Asia. I weight Factory Asia‟s tariffs by FDI employment and find a coefficient as low   13 
as 0.08, indicating a quasi inexistent relationship. As predicted, the model provides no 
predictive power when estimated on Australia. 
3.3.3 Could tariff cuts be the result of regionalism? 
Another hypothesis explaining unilateral tariff cuts is the advent of regional trade agreements. 
Indeed, Calvo-Pardo et al. (2009) suggest that the preferential tariff cuts in ASEAN caused 
the cuts in MFN tariffs. One might therefore ask whether this is the case for all countries of 
Factory Asia.  
Firstly, while countries in Factory Asia are now increasingly active in forming trade 
agreements, this was not the case during the period of study. China may now have sealed 14 
trade agreements but it started only in 2002 when signing with ASEAN. South Korea signed 
its first with Chile in 2004. Malaysia signed its first with Japan in 2005, while the Philippines 
did the same in 2006 and Indonesia in 2007. Thailand signed a limited one with China 
including only agriculture in 2003. Hence, only ASEAN preferences could have mattered for 
the period studied in this paper.  
I test for this by looking at whether tariff cuts in the four concerned ASEAN countries are 
explained by preferential margins. To do so, I regress tariff cuts on a dummy indicating 
whether or not the product has a preferential margin. For parts and components, about 55% of 
products (HS4 level) do. For finished products, the share is as high as 70%. I look across 
products within country-period to check whether MFN cuts were deeper for products with 
preferences.  
Results in table 3 suggest cuts were significantly deeper for products with preferential 
margins, confirming the result of Calvo-Pardo et al. (2009). More precisely, tariffs on parts 
and components were cut by 13.1% more if a preferential rate existed. Moreover, using the 
margin itself as an explaining variable I find that MFN cuts were deeper for products with 
larger preferential margins, indicating that regionalism did most likely have a positive effect 
on unilateral tariff cutting.  
Table 3.  Do preferential margins explain tariff cuts in ASEAN? 
  Parts  Non-parts  Parts  Non-parts 
Tariff (at t=0)  - 1.23***  -0.58***  -1.19***  -0.52*** 
  (0.12)  (0.06)  (0.12)    (0.06)    
Preferential margin dummy (at t=0)  -13.1***  -1.47     
  (3.24)    (2.31)       
Preferential margin (%) (at t=0)      -0.34***  -0.17** 
      (0.04)    (0.08)   
N  2059  2248  2059  2248 
R2  .147  .139  .156  .150 
OLS regressions with country-period fixed effects. Dependent variable is tariff growth. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** denote statistical significance at the 1% level.   14 
I also look at the spatial correlation in tariffs in the presence of preferential margins. Firstly I 
include the preferential tariff scheduled at negotiations in 1993 as an explaining variable of 
tariffs, using data from the ASEAN secretariat. The idea here is that the preferential tariffs 
determined during ASEAN negotiations are behind the following unilateral cuts. Results in 
the first column of table 4 indicate that, while the preferential tariff schedule is significant in 
explaining tariff levels, it does not provide more explanatory power than the race-to-the-
bottom effect. Indeed, the two coefficients are statistically indistinguishable (Chow test p-
value of 0.24). Hence, controlling for regionalism does not make the race-to-the-bottom 
forces insignificant. I then include the current preferential margin or preference dummy as a 
determinant of tariffs on parts and components and look at whether preferences affect the 
spatial dependence. I thus estimate 
              
  ijt ijt ijt ijt t ij ijt m W m W *
1 1 ,  
where  ijt m is the preferential margin (in percentage points) (or the preference dummy) on 
product i in country j in period t, W is the weighting matrix defined as including the inverted 
difference in GDP per capita and the “lost” Japanese FDI employment. Results in columns 2 
and 3 of table 4 indicate that, if anything, regionalism may accentuate the competitive 
pressure on tariffs. 
Table 4. Do tariffs on parts and components follow Factory Asia’s tariffs even in the 
presence of regionalism? 
(Inverted difference in GDP per capita + “lost” 












Preferential dummy (at t=0)    -3.31*** 
(0.76) 
 
Interaction    0.208* 
(0.11) 
 
Preferential margin (%)   (at t=0) 
 




    0.001  
(.002) 
Adj R2  0.78  0.77  0.77 
Obs  1704  1723  855 
Within country-product with period dummies. Dependent variable is MFN tariff. Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. *** denote statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
In figure 5 I show that the spatial correlation increases slightly, though not significantly, for 
products with higher preferential margins. This suggests that regionalism and the competitive 
forces that trigger unilateral trade liberalization may be complement. This would suggest that 
the perceived cooperation within ASEAN resulted in more intense competition and 
uncoordinated unilateral tariff cutting.   15 
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Thick dashed lines give 90% confidence interval.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of preferential margin.
 
3.3.4 Could tariff cuts be the result of IMF pressure? 
One last hypothesis explaining unilateral tariff cuts is that the liberalization was imposed by 
the IMF as a condition for its loans after the Asian crisis of 1997. I therefore regress tariff 
growth on a dummy that takes the value of one for South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia for 
periods 3 and 4, as well as for periods 1 to 4 for the Philippines which were under an IMF 
programme even before the crisis. Based on regressions in table 1, I include also tariff levels 
on the right hand side. I run regressions both within product-period and within country-
product. As reported in table 5, IMF pressure seems to matter only for finished products as the 
coefficient is positive and insignificant for parts and components, suggesting cuts were less 
deep in countries affected by IMF conditions. This suggests that IMF pressure played no role 
in the tariff cuts on parts and components, what constitute the deepest liberalization gains 
(table 1).  
Table 5. IMF pressure? 
  Parts  Non-parts  Parts  Non-parts 
Tariff (at t=0)  -0.49**  -0.457**  -1.66*  -.97** 
       (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.78)  (0.12) 
IMF programme (t=0)  5.01  -8.85***  11.85  -8.14 
  (14.1)  (3.61)  (19.6)  (8.26) 
Adjusted R2   0.10   0.04   0.01   0.04 
N   3882   4029   3882   4022 
Fixed effects  product-period  country-product 
OLS regressions. Dependent variable is tariff growth. Country-clustered s.e. in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
   16 
4. Conclusion 
This paper provides, to the best of my knowledge, the first empirical assessment of race-to-
the-bottom unilateralism. It suggests that the two decades of unilateral tariff cutting in Asia‟s 
emerging economies have been driven, at least in part, by a competition to attract FDI from 
Japan. Racing governments were cutting tariffs to obtain marginal locational advantages in 
attracting multinationals that relied on imports of parts and components for local processing. 
While regionalism and IMF pressure may also have played a role in Factory Asia‟s unilateral 
trade liberalization, I find no evidence that these forces outweighed those of FDI competition.  
As Sally (2008) observes, in an increasingly integrated region with supply chains spread 
across countries, unilateral measures and competitive emulation, rather than WTO 
negotiations, are likely to be the main vehicle for future liberalisation. As for development 
policy, the Factory Asia model reveals that FDI competition can provide the right political 
incentives for unilateral liberalization and trade integration. This has indeed happened in 
Mauritius, where in 2005, in reaction to foreign competition and massive job losses in 
factories, the government cut taxes, slashed red tape and dropped tariffs (The Economist 
2008). 
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Appendix - Building the spatial matrix (One period, one product case) 
 


























where  it   is the applied average MFN tariff of country i at time t.  
 
The first prediction of the race-to-the-bottom theory is that tariffs follow their competitors‟ 
only if the latter were lower. Hence, I define W1 as a matrix that gives weight only to 
competing countries‟ tariffs that are lower. To compute W1 I first define Γ, a column vector   18 


























      t t   which gives a skew-symmetric 
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To obtain W1, I replace negative values, which correspond to a higher tariff in competing 
countries, with zero, and I replace positive values with ones. For example, if  1  t i  > 1  jt j  and 























The second prediction of the theory is that Japanese FDI employment in competing countries 
is seen as “lost” employment, creating FDI jealousy. Hence I build W2 whose elements 
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Finally, since countries at similar levels of development might compete more intensively at 
the tariff level, I also construct W3, whose elements are the inverted absolute GDP per capita 
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The spatial weighting matrix can thus be computed as the row-standardized sum of the 
Hadamard product of W1 and the sum of W2 and W3, i.e. W= (W1 ○(W2 + W3)). τit will 
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